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Since 2001: many changes, crises and 
lessons relearnt
The first volume of Late lessons from early warnings 
was published in 2001. Since then, the world has 
changed significantly. It is larger in population 
but smaller in interconnectivity; faster in terms 
of technology adoption but slower in terms of 
policy action in the face of complex interlinked 
problems; more volatile in terms of economic and 
environmental changes, yet more static in terms of 
political reflexivity and adaptations in governance. 
Beyond the current financial and economic 
crises, there are several long‑term, systemic and 
interconnected challenges, such as depletion of 
natural resources, climate change, a 2‑billion 
person increase in the world population by 2050, 
and diminishing ecosystem resilience (EEA, 2011a; 
OECD, 2012; WEF, 2012).
These developments point to two important realities. 
First, the systems of governance misrepresent 
the socio‑ecological system, making societies and 
the environment subordinate to the economy 
— essentially serving as sources of human and 
natural capital. This misrepresentation ignores the 
reality that any civilisation is ultimately dependent 
on its ecological and social foundations and 
that economies function to sustain and enhance 
human well‑being (Passet, 2001). Second, the 
scale, interconnectedness and sheer complexity of 
feedbacks between nature and human interventions 
have outstripped society's capacity to understand, 
recognise and respond to these effects. 
The first volume ended with a call to action for 
policymakers. How much progress has been made 
since then? One important area is that of innovation 
and the effect that precaution can have on it. In 
Volume 1, the difficulties of balancing precaution 
with technological innovation were recognised. 
However, there is now increasing evidence that 
precautionary measures do not stifle innovation, but 
can encourage it, in particular when supported by 
smart regulation or well‑designed tax changes (EEA, 
2011b, 2011c; Ambec et al., 2011; Ashford and Hall, 
2011). 
Volume 1 also invited policymakers to take more 
account of a 'richer body of information from 
more diverse sources'. It identified public health 
and the environment as two fields of science that 
were separate and polarised. And it suggested 
involving a wider range of stakeholders to expand 
the information base and to 'improve public trust in 
society's capacity to control hazards, without stifling 
innovation or compromising science'. These are all 
areas where improvements have been made since 
2001. 
There has been less progress with other lessons, 
particularly the call to 'identify and reduce 
institutional obstacles to learning and action'. Both 
political and scientific 'bureaucratic silos' do not 
seem to have disappeared, despite the frequent 
calls for policy integration and inter‑departmental 
coordination (Hamdouch and Depret, 2010; Phoenix 
et al., 2012).
Worryingly, warnings of impending hazards are, in 
many areas, still not being heeded and the resulting 
damage is far more widespread, geographically, 
across species and extending to future generations, 
who will particularly suffer many of the harmful 
effects of our current energy systems, chemicals and 
technologies. Damage is now shown to be occurring 
at increasingly lower levels of exposure to pollution, 
and the polluters, for the most part, are still not 
paying the full costs of their pollution, partly 
because of a lack of incentives to do so. At the same 
time we see the destruction of the stocks of natural 
capital that underpin human well‑being. It is easy to 
lose sight of the crucial dependence of economies on 
a diverse, healthy and resilient natural environment, 
especially in times of economic crises.
A key message in the 2001 report was the notion 
that 'the growing innovative powers of science 
seem to be outstripping its ability to predict the 
consequences of its applications, while the scale 
of human interventions in nature increases the 
chances that any hazardous impacts may be serious 
and global.' This is happening at an ever‑greater 
pace, with globalised industries racing to introduce 
new technologies but with limited understanding Implications for science and governance | In conclusion
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of what their impacts might be. National 
governments now have less control over globalised 
technologies.
More positively, however, new transformative 
approaches are emerging for managing the 
systemic and interconnected challenges that we 
face (e.g. Gladwell, 2012; Stirling, 2008). They 
are building in particular on the increasing use 
by consumers, citizens and shareholders of the 
power of the internet and social media to demand 
and foster increased participation, responsibility, 
accountability and transparency. 
Such approaches also need longer‑term perspectives. 
Greater complexity, uncertainties, scientific 
ignorance, broader risks and the irreversibility of 
many harmful impacts together necessitate the 
increased use of long‑term scenarios and strategy 
analysis by citizens, governments and corporations 
alike (EEA, 2011a). The long‑term interests of society 
as a whole, distinct from the partial interest of 
particular stakeholders and individuals, also require 
new political and financial institutions that can help 
overcome the short termism of most politics and 
much finance (Ward, 2012; Roderick, 2010; Mainelli 
and Giffords, 2009; RMNO, 2009).
The case studies in this second volume of Late 
lessons from early warnings provide some new 
insights from the lessons of the past that can help 
stimulate actions to reinforce, complement and 
put into practice the emerging transformative 
approaches, mindful of the observation that 'those 
who cannot remember the past are condemned to 
repeat it' (Santayana, 1905).
2001–2013: what new insights emerge?
Many of the cases in this report reveal similar 
lessons to those in the 2001 report. Some insights 
have been strengthened, however, as the body of 
evidence has increased and our understanding of 
ecological and biological systems has improved. The 
case studies in the two volumes of Late lessons from 
early warnings cover a very diverse range of both 
recent and historical chemical and technological 
innovations and their impacts on humans and 
nature. All cases have unique characteristics 
stemming from the type of the innovation, the 
origins and nature of the hazards, the prevailing 
approaches to policymaking, and the cultural 
influences of time and place. The studies also 
share common features, such as key decisions on 
innovation pathways made by a few people on 
behalf of many; a lack of institutional and other 
mechanisms to respond to early warning signals; 
misleading market prices that do not properly 
reflect all costs and risks to society and nature; and 
inadequate accounting for assets and liabilities 
across different types of capital. 
Such features from the past raise questions for 
the future. How, for example, can the innovations 
that are driving knowledge economies, such as 
nanotechnologies, be developed without repeating 
the mistakes of the past? How can the wider and 
wiser application of the precautionary principle 
support decision‑making in the face of uncertainties 
from within complex systems that defy prediction 
and where 'surprises' are inevitable? How can we 
ensure that the lack of 'perfect' knowledge is not 
a justification for inaction in the face of 'plausible' 
evidence of serious harm? How can conflicting 
interests (including public and private ones) be 
balanced in the development, use and impact 
phases? How can the distribution of costs and 
benefits over time be made more equitable? 
The Late lessons from early warnings case studies 
demonstrate the complexities of handling the 
interactions between the many actors and 
institutions involved — governments, policymakers, 
businesses, entrepreneurs, scientists, civil society 
representatives, citizens and the media. Each comes 
to the debate with different and often conflicting 
knowledge, perceptions, interests and priorities; 
balancing these numerous and often antagonistic 
positions should be seen as a prelude to making 
decisions on those innovations that have broad 
societal implications.
The opportunities are manifold but can be boiled 
down to three main ones: 
•  to correct the prioritisation of economic and 
financial capital over social, human and natural 
capitals through the broader application of the 
policy principles of precaution, prevention and 
polluter‑pays, and improved accounting systems 
across government and business; 
•  to broaden the nature of evidence and public 
engagement in choices about crucial innovation 
pathways by balancing scientific efforts more 
towards dealing with complex, systemic 
challenges and unknowns and complementing 
this knowledge with lay, local and traditional 
knowledge; 
•  to build greater adaptability and resilience 
in governance systems to deal with multiple 
systemic threats and surprises, through Implications for science and governance | In conclusion
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strengthening institutional structures and 
deploying information technologies in support 
of the concept of responsible information and 
dialogues. 
Taken together the case studies provide some 
lessons to support action, supplementing the 
conclusions of Volume 1. These findings are 
presented in the remainder of this section.
Reduce delays between early warnings and actions
Most of the case studies in both volumes of Late 
lessons from early warnings illustrate that if the 
precautionary principle had been applied on the 
basis of early warnings, many lives would have 
been saved and much morbidity and damage to 
ecosystems would have been avoided.
Today, several factors related to the speed, scale 
and breadth of technological innovation exacerbate 
the tendency to delay action. First, by the time 
evidence of harm is confirmed, the technology has 
often changed, leading to assumptions that, unlike 
yesterday's technology, today's technology is now 
safe. Second, for some technologies (e.g. broad‑
scale energy production systems or chemical 
plants), the huge initial investments mean that 
yesterday's investments will be redeemed before 
any serious risk reduction is implemented, creating 
de facto technological lock‑ins. Third, the scale of 
technological development puts very difficult 
demands on those attempting to monitor and 
respond to the risks before they have become 
serious, widespread and irreversible. 
These features of contemporary life further 
strengthen the case for taking early warning signals 
more seriously and acting on lower strengths of 
evidence than those normally used to adduce 
'scientific causality'. 
The case studies have shown that the main barriers 
to timely action include the short‑term nature 
of many political and financial horizons; the 
novel and challenging nature of the technologies 
and the scientific problems that arise from their 
interactions with complex biological, ecological 
and social systems; the conservative nature of 
much environment and health science; the ways in 
which scientific and other evidence is evaluated; 
the different perspectives and interests of many 
stakeholders and the vested interests of some 
powerful ones; and the broader cultural and 
institutional circumstances of public policymaking 
that often favour the status quo. 
Addressing these causes of delay can help to 
reduce the negative impacts that arise from many 
innovations. But tackling them is not easy. For 
example, the problem of the unequal distribution 
of political power between citizens, business and 
financial actors, and governments is a persistent 
problem of politics, which has increased through 
globalisation and the rise of multinational 
corporations, yet it is an issue that is well beyond 
the scope of this report. Some of the other causes of 
delay are more amenable to change and these are 
addressed in the rest of this section.
In evaluating the pros and cons of using the 
precautionary principle, it is important to remember 
that the harm from most hazards analysed in the 
case studies turned out to be more diverse and 
widespread than anticipated and such damage 
is often found to occur at exposures lower than 
initially considered dangerous. 
For example, it has been known since 1960 that 
asbestos causes the mesothelioma cancer, in addition 
to lung cancer (identified in 1955) and asbestosis 
(identified in 1906–1929). Similarly, it is now known 
that smoking causes a wide range of cancers, heart 
disease and foetal damage, beyond the harm of 
lung cancer identified in 1951. PCBs are now known 
to cause neurological problems in children, and 
cancer, in addition to harming the reproduction 
of eagles (identified in the 1960s). Lead has also 
been demonstrated to be more broadly chronically 
harmful — it was initially recognised as damaging 
children's IQ but it is now known to cause heart 
disease in adults. Radiation has gone through a 
similar expansion of known hazards. 
This phenomenon of 'harm expansion' is rendered 
more problematic by the discoveries that harm from 
all of the above agents has been found to occur at 
lower and lower levels, such that, more often than 
not, no 'safe' threshold of exposure can be identified. 
This knowledge needs to be taken into account 
when evaluating the potential pros and cons of 
future precautionary action on emerging issues. 
Continuous, anticipatory reductions in exposures 
to emerging hazards could help to avoid repeating 
these histories of harm expansion. 
More and better prospective and retrospective 
analyses of the costs of action and inaction, across 
the full lifecycle of a technology, would highlight 
the value of precautionary and preventive actions, 
particularly the value of 'secondary benefits and 
costs' which can be substantial, such as the health 
benefits from reduced fossil fuel use, where the 
main objective is to mitigate climate change. They Implications for science and governance | In conclusion
673 Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation
should also consider the psychological and societal 
costs of both false alarms concerning a health 
hazard, e.g. the over‑reaction to swine flu in the US 
in the 1970s, and misplaced reassurances concerning 
the safety of a technology, such as the downplaying 
of risks associated to nuclear power plants by 
Japanese authorities and utilities. Such pro and 
con analyses should be independent of interested 
parties, both commercial and political, as they often 
have a 'natural' tendency to exaggerate costs of 
hazard reduction and to underestimate the benefits 
of action. 
As case studies from both volumes have also shown, 
the timely use of the precautionary principle can 
often stimulate rather than hamper innovation, 
in part by promoting a diversity of technologies 
and activities, which can also help to increase the 
resilience of societies and ecosystems to future 
surprises. Keeping options open and following 
multiple paths means that a particular option can 
be terminated if it turns out to pose high risks, and 
avoids situations of technological monopolies such 
as those experienced, for example, in the cases of 
asbestos, CFCs and PCBs. 
In contrast, technological monopolies hamper 
innovation. For example, it was the monopolies of 
lead in petrol, asbestos, CFCs and PCBs that both 
prolonged the harms they caused and made those 
harms widespread. These monopolies contributed 
to technological 'lock‑in' but also to institutional 
and ideological lock‑ins, which further hampered 
innovation and the development of alternatives. 
These technologies and their products were also 
'cheap' in the market place, bearing little relation to 
their real costs in terms of harm to the environment, 
human health and financial compensation to 
victims. These artificially low market prices in 
turn helped to stifle the development of smart 
substitutes. 
This past experience should be taken into account 
with the emerging technologies such as GMOs and 
nanotechnologies, where there are already signs of 
technological monopolies, driven by the high costs 
of research, development and production involved 
and the patent protections for developers on many 
of their products and processes (Stirling, 2007; van 
den Hove et al., 2012).
When applying the precautionary principle, there 
are, therefore, not only scientific issues to be 
considered but also ethical choices, concerning 
the appropriate strength of evidence for action; 
the equity implications arising from the costs and 
benefits of action and inaction; the appropriate 
balance between generating false negatives and 
false positives; and the social necessity of large‑scale 
innovations. 
Clearly, acting to avoid or reduce harm on lower 
strengths of evidence than that used to establish 
scientific causality will sometimes increase the 
number of false alarms — although the review of 88 
cases of alleged false positives in Volume 2 of Late 
lessons from early warnings confirmed just four actual 
cases, suggesting that the risks are considerably less 
than sometimes claimed. Moreover, it is important 
to recognise that, in cases where there are damages 
over a long time span that may irreversibly alter 
the system, there is a fundamental asymmetry 
between the competing policy and scientific 
options of avoiding false negatives and avoiding 
false positives. Examples of such situations of 
irreversibility include climate change, modification 
to the genetic make‑up of humans or other species, 
persistent chemical or radioactive contamination, 
and species loss. 
If an early warning signal triggers a double reaction 
of precautionary policy measures and more 
intensive research on risks and alternatives, then 
at some point the research may show that this was 
a false alarm and the precautionary measure can 
be cancelled. The loss in this case will be a delay in 
economic and social benefits from the technology 
(or the cost of mitigating actions in cases such as 
climate change) during the time it took to show 
that there was no cause for concern. But the system 
will not be irreversibly altered. In contrast, if the 
early warning triggers no precautionary action but 
more research shows, only much later, that there 
was indeed real cause for concern then irreversible 
systemic damages will already have taken place. 
Acknowledging this asymmetry is central to 
understanding when precautionary and preventive 
approaches are best deployed. 
Tipping the overall balance of public policy towards 
avoiding harm, even at the cost of more false alarms, 
would seem to be a price that is well worth paying, 
given the costs of being wrong in acting or not 
acting. This is one of the strategic and ethical societal 
choices, similar to the choice of strengths of evidence 
to be used in civil or criminal court cases, that needs 
to be openly debated. 
Acknowledge complexity when dealing with 
multiple effects and thresholds 
The world is drawing down its natural capital 
through an over‑reliance on fossil‑fuel‑based, Implications for science and governance | In conclusion
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synthetic chemicals that are compromising the 
health and resilience of ecosystems and key 
organisms such as fish and bees, in combination 
with other stressors such as climate change and 
invasive alien species. There is also evidence that 
some types of genetically modified crops (and the 
agrochemical substances used alongside them), 
which are released into the environment and the 
food chain, present a threat to human health, some 
species and ecosystems, and food security. Human 
health is being further compromised by chemicals 
that threaten health from before birth, through 
childhood and into adulthood. (Barouki et al., 2012; 
EEA, 2012; Kortenkamp et al., 2011).
Such exposures appear to contribute to increases 
of many types of cancers, birth defects, male 
infertility, and cardiovascular, neurological and 
immunological dysfunctions and diseases. The 
impacts of these hazards are being supplemented 
by the harmful effects of unhealthy eating habits 
and lifestyles in many parts of the world, and 
resulting in epidemics such as diabetes and obesity. 
Taken together, these multiple stressors have 
profound public health significance. 
Growing scientific knowledge clearly shows that 
the causal links between stressors and harm are 
more complex than was previously thought and 
this has practical consequences for minimising 
harm. Much of the harm described in Volumes 1 
and 2, such as cancers or species decline, is 
caused by several co‑causal factors acting either 
independently or together. For example, the 
reduction of intelligence in children can be linked 
to lead in petrol, mercury and PCBs as well as to 
socio‑economic factors; bee colony collapse can be 
linked to viruses, climate change and nicotinoid 
pesticides; and climate change itself is caused 
by many complex and inter‑linked chemical and 
physical processes. 
In some cases, such as foetal or fish exposures, 
it is the timing of the exposure to a stressor that 
causes the harm, not necessarily the amount; 
the harm may also be caused or exacerbated 
by other stressors acting in a particular timed 
sequence. In other cases, such as chemicals like 
BPA, low exposures can be more harmful than 
high exposures; and in others, such as asbestos 
with tobacco, and some endocrine disrupting 
substances, the harmful effects of mixtures can 
be greater than from each separate stressor. 
There are also varying susceptibilities to the 
same stressors in different people, species and 
ecosystems, depending on pre‑existing stress 
levels, genetics and epigenetics. This variation can 
lead to differences in thresholds or tipping point 
exposures, above which harm becomes apparent in 
some exposed groups or ecosystems but not others. 
Indeed there are some harmful effects that occur 
only at the level of the system, such as a bee colony, 
which cannot be predicted from analysing a single 
part of the system, such as an individual bee.
The increased knowledge of complex biological 
and ecological systems has also revealed that 
certain harmful substances, such as PCBs and 
DDT can move around the world via a range of 
biogeochemical and physical processes and then 
accumulate in organisms and ecosystems many 
thousands of kilometres away. The practical 
implications of these observations are threefold. 
First, it is very difficult to establish very strong 
evidence that a single substance or stressor 'causes' 
harm to justify timely actions to avoid harm; in 
many cases only reasonable evidence of co‑causality 
will be available. Second, a lack of consistency 
between research results is not a strong reason for 
dismissing possible causal links: inconsistency is to 
be expected from complexity. Third, while reducing 
harmful exposure to one co‑causal factor may not 
necessarily lead to a large reduction in the overall 
harm caused by many other factors, in some cases 
the removal of just one link in the chain of multi‑
causality could reduce much harm. 
A more holistic and multi‑disciplinary systems 
science is needed to analyse and manage the causal 
complexity of the systems in which we live and 
to address long‑term implications. For example, 
there would be substantial benefits from exploring, 
much earlier and more systematically, the multiple 
effects on people and ecosystems of chemical 
and other stressors, their cumulative effects, 
chemical metabolites, and their mixture effects. 
Exposures to low doses of contaminants and their 
effects, particularly in susceptible sub groups in 
populations, should also be more fully investigated, 
accompanied by more biological monitoring that 
would improve the detection of the precursors of 
disease. 
Several case studies provide examples of where 
assertions that 'no evidence of harm' have been 
interpreted as 'evidence of no harm', which may 
not be the case if appropriate research over relevant 
time periods is missing. Examples include leaded 
petrol in the 1920s‑60s, and risks to children from 
mobile phones before 2011, when the first study 
on children was published. Such authoritative but 
unsubstantiated assertions of safety have led to 
much harm, for example, in cases such as asbestos, 
tobacco, lead and mercury.Implications for science and governance | In conclusion
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Acknowledging both uncertainties and scientific 
ignorance is particularly important where the 
science is relatively immature, as with such 
emerging technologies as GM crops, mobile phones, 
nanotechnology and invasive alien species and 
where exposures are widespread. Recognising 
uncertainty also helps to avoid putting too much 
reliance on simple models of complex systems as 
in the cases of floods, nuclear accidents, climate 
change, ecosystems resilience and multi‑pollutant 
human exposures 
Uncertainty, though, can be a two‑edged sword, 
being used as the basis for challenging both 
assurances of safety and evidence of a hazard. 
In particular, uncertainty has been misused, 
exaggerated, or even 'manufactured' in order to 
delay and undermine regulatory measures to protect 
health and environments. Examples include climate 
change, tobacco, lead, honeybees and beryllium 
(Michaels, 2008; Oreskes and Conway, 2010). 
There is also an asymmetry between the high 
levels of proof of harm demanded by proponents 
of a technology as sufficient to justify remedial or 
preventive actions compared to the level of evidence 
they deem sufficient to claim that their products are 
'safe'. Waiting for high levels of proof of harm before 
acting not only leads to much harm but also to a 
stifling of innovation, as the case studies on asbestos, 
lead, mercury, PCBs and CFCs illustrate. 
Rethink and enrich environment and health research 
The need for research to focus more on the potential 
hazards of emerging technologies in addition to 
research on product applications has already been 
noted. It would also be helpful if there were a 
greater focus on emerging hazards rather than on 
well‑known risks. Recent research (Grandjean et 
al., 2011) indicates that much environmental health 
research still focuses on well known hazards, such 
as lead and mercury, and tends to ignore newly 
emerging threats to health. The top ten substances 
studied are all metals such as copper, lead, zinc 
and cadmium. These established hazards account 
for approximately half of all the journal articles 
on impacts of chemical substances of the last ten 
years (Grandjean et al., 2011). This disproportion 
has crowded out research into other dangerous 
hazards and risks, such as on endocrine‑disrupting 
substances and other hazards where less is known 
about their pathways and impacts (despite over EUR 
100 million of EU research funding on endocrine 
disrupting compounds in the last decade) but where 
the evidence is growing of widespread impacts on 
humans and nature (EEA, 2012; Kortenkamp et al., 
2011).
A major reason for this imbalance may relate to the 
prevailing regulatory science paradigm, where solid 
conclusions depend on replication and verification. 
Other likely contributing factors to scientific inertia 
are the effective use of costly infrastructure to ensure 
value for money; the desire of policymakers for more 
certainty from science regarding politically difficult 
choices; and the tendency of funding agencies to be 
conservative in their research strategies.
In order to identify hazards that may only appear 
over decades, there needs to be more long term 
monitoring of biological and ecological systems, 
focusing on 'surprise sensitive' parameters such 
as bees, amphibians, invertebrates, foetuses etc. 
Such monitoring will also be essential to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the precautionary and later 
measures to avoid harm. Monitoring can be 
supported in part by citizen scientists, using the 
latest geographical information systems (GIS) and 
monitoring technologies. 
Several cases highlight the benefit of having lay and 
local knowledge alongside scientific evaluation of 
harm so that a broader knowledge base can support 
decision‑making. For example, when a mother 
hypothesised that neurological signs observed in 
her son were due to exposure to mercury in her 
womb, this was dismissed by experts who did 
not question their assumption that the placenta 
provided protection (see Chapter 5 on Minamata 
disease). Patients, fishers, wives (e.g. in the sperm 
damaging, described in Chapter 9 on DBCP), 
mothers (see Chapter 5 as well as and the chapter 
on DES in Volume 1 (EEA, 2001, Ch. 8)), factory 
workers, and bee keepers, as well as clinicians and 
factory inspectors are amongst those non‑scientists 
who have reliably provided early warnings in the 
case studies. 
Precautionary actions are justified by lower strengths 
of evidence than those conventionally used for 
establishing scientific causation, yet in their search 
for 'certainty' scientists are cautious in attributing 
causation to an agent while some scientists may 
sometimes be less cautious when asserting 'safety'. 
The case studies show that in the past there have been 
premature assertions of safety based on inadequate 
scientific methods, such as an over‑reliance on studies 
that were conducted over too short a period to reveal 
long‑term effects for example. 
Also evidence of harm has often had to reach the 
high standard of 'causality' as is the standard for Implications for science and governance | In conclusion
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less complex situations, rather than precautionary 
strengths of evidence based on plausible association 
between hazards and harms. The strength of 
evidence chosen can range from 'a scientific 
suspicion' of harm to 'beyond all reasonable doubt', 
depending on the complexity of the system, the 
level of protection required and the pros and cons of 
being wrong in acting or not acting.
To avoid waiting for strong evidence of harm in 
humans and ecosystems, data from animal or 
other species and methods (ECVAM), should be 
more widely used to justify precautionary action. 
This is particularly needed where the potential 
damage is irreversible — as with some cancers, 
species and ecosystems losses, and reproductive or 
developmental effects.
Research, precaution, and exposure control also need 
to be applied to the substitutes or alternatives to 
hazardous agents. The chapters on perchloroethylene 
(Chapter 4), leaded petrol (Chapter 3), DDT 
(Chapter 11) and booster biocides (Chapter 12) 
as well as the chapters on CFCs and MTBE in 
Volume 1 (EEA, 2001, Ch. 7 and Ch. 11) illustrate 
the hazards that some alternatives have brought in 
the wake of banned substances, especially when the 
alternatives are chemically very similar (e.g. HFCs 
for CFCs). Minimising the hazards of alternatives 
could be helped by the avoidance of such chemical 
characteristics as persistence, bioaccumulation, 
and large spatial range; by the hazard screening of 
alternatives; and by the greater use of the knowledge 
to be found in smarter and greener chemistry and 
technology.
Greater awareness of the complexity, 
interconnectedness, multi‑causality and 
uncertainties inherent in global environmental 
issues underlines the need for greater humility 
about what science can and cannot tell us. 
Framing issues as purely scientific and technical 
inappropriately places scientific perspectives above 
equally valid social and ethical contributions that 
should be part of decision‑making. A shift is needed 
to more explicitly integrative environmental science 
approaches in support of public policy, in which 
systemic considerations and early warnings feature 
strongly. This shift has started to take place in 
discourses but often not in practices. 
The case studies in Volume 2 of Late lessons from early 
warnings also illustrate how regulatory health and 
environmental science is still defined in very narrow 
terms, which obstructs it from being able to identify 
the complex multifactorial stresses on environmental 
systems and humans. There is therefore a need for 
environmental science to become more attuned to 
the inherent complexities of socio‑ecological systems 
by, for example, balancing a traditional disciplinary 
focus with more holistic cross‑disciplinary scientific 
research, thereby complementing precision with 
relevance and comprehensiveness (Phoenix et al., 
2012). Such science would often embrace longer 
timescales, more end‑points, and multi‑causality.
Since the first volume of Late lessons from early 
warnings, scientific approaches such as 'sustainability 
science', 'systems biology' or 'futures research' have 
continued to emerge to help deal with some of the 
challenges arising from the interconnections and 
dynamics of socio‑ecological systems, focusing 
on analysis and interventions at the systems level. 
These emerging disciplines can also help build 
bridges between research, policy communities, other 
stakeholders and the public (Kates, 2011). 
Last but not least, the case studies show that early 
warners — scientists and others — have often 
been harassed for their pioneering work which 
threatened economic interests and often challenged 
conventional scientific paradigms. This harassment 
can include bans on speaking out or publishing; 
loss of funding; legal or other threats; demotion; 
transfer to other work and character assassination 
in scientific and other media (McCulloch and 
Tweedale, 2007; Martin, 1999, 2008; UCS, 2012). Such 
early warners should receive better protection via 
the extension of 'whistle blowing' and discrimination 
laws; by more active support and protection from 
scientific societies in the case of scientists; and by 
awards that acknowledge the value of their work. 
Improve the quality and value of risk assessments
Volume 1 stressed the differences between risk, 
uncertainty and scientific ignorance, and the 
need to acknowledge and identify all three when 
doing evaluations of evidence, as in formal risk 
assessments. Since 2001, some considerable progress 
has been made in characterising uncertainties in 
risk assessments, for example, in the food industry 
(EFSA, 2006, 2013), the field of emerging risks 
(SCENIHR, 2012), and in climate change (IPCC, 
2010). This recognition of uncertainty and ignorance 
is particularly important where there is much 
reliance on modelling, as in climate change, invasive 
alien species, or exposure assessment. 
The majority of case studies indicate that it is often 
inappropriate to use a narrow conception of 'risk' 
to manage the complex issues at hand with their 
inevitable features of ignorance, indeterminacy Implications for science and governance | In conclusion
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and contingency. The increasing awareness of 
the complexity of biological, ecological and 
technological systems, calls into question the 
relevance and prevalence of some of the simplistic 
methods, models and assumptions used in risk 
assessments. For example, linear dose response 
curves can be inappropriate when low doses are 
more harmful than high doses, as in the BPA story; 
the dictum that the dose alone 'makes the poison' 
is inaccurate when it is the timing of the dose that 
makes the dose harmful, as in the TBT and DES 
cases; assuming uni‑causality is too simplistic when 
multi‑causality is the reality, as in the lead case 
study and many ecosystems such as fisheries; testing 
for single substances is inadequate when mixtures 
are present as in all cases of chemical exposures; 
and there can be an over‑reliance on statistical 
significance when use of confidence limits would be 
more appropriate. 
Simplistic assumptions are also observed in 
technological risk assessments. As the Fukushima 
Investigation Committee (NAIIC, 2012) concluded, 
'the accidents present us with crucial lessons on 
how we should be prepared for 'incidents beyond 
assumptions'. With its failure to plan for the cascade 
effects beyond design–base accidents 'the regulatory 
emphasis on risk based probabilistic risk assessment 
has proven very limited'. 
In other words, narrow risk assessment approaches 
are now outstripped by the realities that they cannot 
address, recognise and communicate. Too often this 
contributes to effective denial of those risks that 
do not fit the risk assessment frame. It is therefore 
urgent to transform risk assessment practices 
to make them broader‑based, more inclusive, 
transparent and accountable. That should also 
enable more transparent communication of diverse 
scientific views, especially on emerging issues 
where the uncertainties and ignorance are high and 
genuine differences of scientific interpretations are 
likely, desirable, and defensible (Stirling, 2010). 
In practice, risk assessments could be improved 
by including a wider range of stakeholders 
when framing the scientific risk agenda, through 
ensuring all available evidence is readily accessible, 
by broadening the scope and membership of 
risk evaluation committees, by increasing the 
transparency and consistency of committee 
approaches and methods, and by ensuring their 
independence of vested interests. Improvements in 
transparency were recently announced by EFSA, 
who wish all data submitted as part of the product 
authorisation procedure to be made publicly 
available, (EFSA, 2013).
The case studies on mercury, nuclear accidents, 
leaded petrol, mobile phones, BPA and bees, have 
shown that there can be significant divergence in the 
evaluations of the same, or very similar, scientific 
evidence by different risk assessment committees. 
It is often not clear from their published reports 
why this is so. It would be helpful if each risk 
assessment report explained the committee's choice 
of paradigms, assumptions, criteria for accepting 
evidence, weights placed on different types of 
evidence, and how uncertainties were handled. 
This would also help reduce the confusion amongst 
users of such divergent risk assessments when 
they are faced with very different evaluations of 
essentially the same evidence. It would also help 
people to recognise the difference between 'settled 
fact, majority opinion, legitimate minority view, 
and unsubstantiated assertions' (Weiss, 2002). 
Moreover, it is helpful if the sources of finance for 
the research studies under consideration are made 
explicit because of the 'funding bias' that has been 
observed in research on issues such as tobacco, 
pharmaceuticals, food, BPA, GM products and 
mobile phones. 
The case studies on bees, lead, BPA and nuclear 
accident risks have shown that the scope and 
membership of some risk assessment committees 
have been too narrow, and they have sometimes 
been dominated by one discipline or paradigm 
with shared assumptions which are not therefore 
questioned. Risk assessments can be made more 
reliable if they embrace all relevant scientific 
knowledge and approaches. For example 
endocrinology currently brings new insights 
into hormonally active biological systems that 
complement conventional toxicology. Toxicity test 
methods and risk assessments can benefit from more 
recent yet reliable scientific knowledge emerging 
from academic research fields. 
The case studies also show that toxicity tests 
designed for acute effects are unlikely to be 
relevant to chronic effects, and that novel 
technologies, such as systemic pesticides that 
replace sprayed pesticides or new chemical 
compounds replacing earlier ones, usually need 
novel risk assessments.
The value of being transparent about what is 
known and not known and about uncertainties 
and disagreements is equally pertinent. Scientific 
conclusions should not be portrayed as if there is 
consensus when there is not. Science by its nature 
progresses by building on critical appraisal. Several 
cases show that disagreement can be helpful to 
decision‑makers with a broader picture of the Implications for science and governance | In conclusion
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alternative directions and options available before 
making a decision. 
The whole process of risk analysis which 
includes risk assessments, risk management and 
risk communication, would benefit from the 
involvement of stakeholders, particularly when 
framing the risk assessment and identifying options 
for risk management. This is illustrated in Ch. 27 on 
the precautionary principle. 
Foster cooperation between business, government 
and citizens 
An element that is often missing from innovation 
policies and practice is the recognition that 
innovation should be considered as a means, 
not an end in itself, and desirable to the extent 
that it improves human health and well‑being 
while maintaining ecological resilience. Policy 
formulation should start from these premises and 
from a broader concept that includes not only 
technological innovation but also non‑technological, 
social, institutional, organisational and behavioural 
innovation (van den Hove et al., 2012).
In this framework, governments have at least 
three roles: first, providing direction by putting 
in place smart regulations and consistent market 
signals; second, ensuring that the distributional 
consequences of innovations are balanced between 
risks and rewards across society; and third, fostering 
a diversity of innovations so that the wider interests 
of society take precedence over narrower interests. 
Numerous case studies show that decisions to act 
without precaution often come from businesses. 
There are, however, several impediments to 
businesses acting in a precautionary manner, 
including a fundamental economic focus on 
creating and increasing short‑term economic 
value for shareholders. There are also a number 
of psychological factors involved that lead to a 
so‑called 'ethical blindness' or a 'self‑serving bias' 
whereby people largely (and often unconsciously) 
tend to interpret ambiguous situations in their own 
interests. 
This report reveals interesting parallels between 
older case studies and fast emerging issues such 
as nanotechnologies, genetically modified crops, 
new chemicals, and the possible link between brain 
tumours and non‑ionising radiation from mobile 
phones. For example, only a very small number of 
actors were involved in making strategic decisions 
about lead in petrol in the USA in 1925 yet the 
technology spread all around the world before being 
phased out some 60 years later. With issues such as 
GMOs in food and energy options for a low carbon 
future, only a relatively few actors are involved in 
choosing innovation pathways that will shape the 
future of agriculture and energy supply and use for 
many decades. 
Governments and businesses could collaborate more 
with citizens and civil society on publicly disclosing 
and analysing the potential value conflicts entailed 
in acting on early warning signals. Public disclosure 
and a culture of transparency and open discussion 
can in turn promote positive business attitudes 
and innovations. As stressed above, in many cases, 
accurate determination of risk is difficult and open 
to disagreement, making engagement, openness and 
transparency all the more important. 
Involving the public can also help in choosing 
between those innovation pathways to the future 
(WBCSD, 2010; EC, 2011; WBGU, 2012); identifying 
and prioritising relevant public research (e.g. Diedrich 
et al., 2011); providing data and information from 
other knowledge holders — including NGOs, lay 
observers and citizens — in support of monitoring 
and early warnings; improving risk assessments; 
identifying and considering both alternatives to 
potentially hazardous agents and the unintended 
consequences of both actions and inactions on such 
agents; striking appropriate trade‑offs between 
innovations and plausible health and environmental 
harms; and, making decisions about risk‑risk 
trade‑offs, such as the health benefits of consuming 
fish which contains mercury and PCBs. In particular, 
a feature of the studies is the top‑down nature of 
innovations — the history of antibiotics in animal 
feed and lead in petrol, for example, show how a 
very small number of people can take decisions 
which have a major impact on millions. The public 
should help shape the future, including helping to 
choose strategic innovation pathways, for example, 
to sustainable agriculture and low impact renewable 
energy systems, by 2050. 
The case studies also illustrate that there is often a 
lack of public accountability and access to the private 
research on which public protection authorities rely. 
Such access would help to increase independent 
verification of data submitted for licensing and would 
increase public trust in the regulatory authorities at a 
time when such trust in elites is very low. 
Information and communications technologies 
(ICT) and their role in transforming social behaviour 
can help to engage the public on these issues. ICT 
has spawned a wide range of new collaborative Implications for science and governance | In conclusion
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tools and approaches, which, as we saw above, are 
already transforming the dynamics of governance 
and innovation, fostering two‑way interactions, 
and which can be used to support a more diverse 
approach to engaging with citizens. Less positively, 
ICT developments and access to knowledge may be 
building barriers to collaboration by fostering more 
hectic interactions and competition in the pursuit of 
enhanced productivity, less face‑to‑face contact, and 
less space for thinking through possible solutions 
to complex realities. Creating the space for more 
deliberative thinking and innovation could contribute 
to more collaborative problem solving.
For public engagement to be effective there needs 
to be adequate procedures for identifying and 
including the relevant stakeholders and public 
interest groups and for the provision of adequate 
educational and financial resources to enable such 
groups to play an effective role. Public engagement 
can be encouraged and supported by substantially 
improved and simpler access to relevant data and 
information, building on the provisions of the Aarhus 
Convention and national freedom of information 
laws. Business concerns about confidentiality and 
competitiveness can be overcome through judicious 
use of information technologies to manage access 
rights while maintaining transparency on how such 
information has been used and the insights drawn.
Today there are large imbalances within publicly 
financed research between product development 
and the study of potential hazards, an imbalance that 
seems to repeat the histories of better‑known hazards. 
In Europe for example, in the period 2002–2013, 
about 1 % of the total amount that the EU Framework 
Programmes of Research and Development allocated 
to developing products from nanotechnologies, 
biotechnologies and ICT was spent researching their 
potential hazards. Research carried out by private 
industry may well show a similar imbalance, but data 
is not easy to obtain. 
Correcting this imbalance between researching 
innovations and their applications, and anticipatory 
researching of potential hazards posed throughout 
their life cycle (production, use, recycling and 
disposal) can help avoid unequal distribution of costs 
and benefits further down the line and support a 
better public acceptability of such technologies. 
Correct market failures using the polluter pays and 
prevention principles
When evidence of initial harm emerges, the costs 
of such harm need to be internalised into the prices 
of polluting products, via taxes and charges, in line 
with the polluter pays principle. The revenues could 
be devoted partly to stimulating research into less 
hazardous alternatives, as was the case in the US 
with CFCs, and partly to reducing taxes and charges 
on labour. 
The pollution taxes/charges would rise or fall in line 
with knowledge about increasing/decreasing harm 
and this would help to level the market playing field 
for innovative alternatives to the harmful products 
that are otherwise subsidised by the external 
costs of their pollution. Tax shifts from labour to 
pollution and inefficient use of resources bring other 
benefits such as increased employment, a stimulus 
to innovation and a more efficient tax system 
(EEA, 2011b and 2011c). 
More realistic market prices, that reflect the true 
economic, environmental and social costs, can 
help encourage more sustainable behaviours 
by governments, businesses and citizens. More 
broadly, firms and governments need to extend their 
accounting systems beyond economic and financial 
capital considerations to incorporate the full human 
and natural capital impacts of their activities, 
building on developing practices worldwide 
(UN, 2012; EEA, 2011d; Puma, 2011).
Many case studies also demonstrate the long time 
lags between evidence of harm and the additional 
injustice and time of forcing victims to pursue their 
case through civil compensation claims. In the case 
of Minamata this took over 50 years. Prompt and 
anticipatory no‑fault compensation schemes for 
victims of harm and damage to ecosystems could 
be set up and financed in advance of potential 
harm by the industries that are producing novel 
and large‑scale technologies, thereby helping to 
correct this market failure. These schemes increase 
incentives for innovating companies to carry out 
more a priori research into the identification and 
elimination of hazards. 
Precedents exist for such schemes in some countries, 
for example for nuclear accidents, oil spills, some 
radiation exposures, and some environmental 
liability laws, including contamination by GM crops 
of adjacent non‑GM farms. Within the schemes 
there needs to be provision for penalising gross 
negligence, which under a tort system justifies 
punitive damages. Consideration also needs to 
be given to the use of anticipatory liability bonds 
by innovating companies so as to increase their 
incentive to minimise hazards and to provide 
adequate funds to compensate those who may 
suffer from any harm that may arise from their Implications for science and governance | In conclusion
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products. Re‑insurance schemes are also playing a 
role in helping to anticipate long tail liabilities from 
emerging technologies. 
Attributing responsibility and sometimes negligence 
to corporations and others active in the history of 
hazards has relied mainly upon evidence uncovered 
by the legal processes of document discovery in 
civil compensation cases. The further use and 
development of freedom of information laws and 
the Aarhus Convention could provide a speedier 
means of accessing documented history. This will 
be even more necessary if no‑fault administrative 
schemes replace some civil compensation cases. 
Governance of innovation and innovation 
in governance
This chapter opens with a picture of unprecedented 
global change and interdependence. Such change 
provides many benefits to societies but also exposes 
them to more shocks and surprises. Scientific and 
technological innovations proceed apace, more 
often than not on trajectories that exacerbate risks 
and threats. At the same time, those researching 
and developing technological innovations often fail 
to acquire relevant existing knowledge from other 
disciplines. Governments tend to use structures 
and methods from the past to monitor the potential 
hazards of future technologies, rather than 
implementing more advanced, flexible and relevant 
approaches.
Failures, such as those presented in the two volumes 
of Late lessons from early warnings, provide numerous 
valuable insights, yet it appears that memories fade 
quickly. Typically, a hazardous event generates a 
sense of urgency and enthusiasm for strengthening 
preparedness systems, initiating research and 
implementing long‑term monitoring, and heavy 
expenditure often follows. In the aftermath of an 
event, relevant authorities elaborate ambitious plans 
and launch works, but lessons are soon forgotten. 
After some time without adverse events, willingness 
to invest in risk research, long‑term monitoring etc. 
decreases sharply and projects are downscaled or 
suspended. Chernobyl and Fukushima are cases in 
point. 
This cycle of events is termed the 'hydro‑illogical 
cycle' in the case study on floods but could perhaps 
be called the 'homo‑illogical cycle' as it seems to be 
a recurrent pattern for humankind, which is found 
across many cultural, political, social and economic 
systems. Despite its prevalence, this pattern need 
not be inescapable. Humans can learn, change 
and transform and there is enormous potential in 
human creativity and its capacity to inspire cultural, 
social, political, institutional, organisational and 
behavioural innovation, beyond 'mere' technological 
innovation. If, as Plato said, necessity is the mother 
of invention, then the crises we are facing create a 
level of necessity that will hopefully engender the 
needed innovations. 
Crucially, governance systems also need to better 
recognise the value conflicts that are underpinning 
all societal and environmental issues. They are 
unavoidable and are even desirable as they are 
constitutive of the human condition. What is often 
missing is the institutional space to have a much 
more systematic, and non‑judgmental, analysis of 
such conflicts so that they can be made explicit, 
enabling policymakers and other actors to start 
working together on the problems along the lines 
described in this chapter. 
Of course such analysis already takes place (in part) 
in some quarters — examples include some 
parliamentary commissions and non‑governmental 
organisations — but it is not sufficiently systematic 
and does not always focus on value conflicts. There 
could be merit in establishing a place in formal 
institutional frameworks where such value conflicts 
(and consequent conflicts of interests) could be 
analysed and proposals offered for their resolution. 
The ideas for the governance of innovation and 
innovations in governance presented in this chapter 
will remain at the level of good intentions unless 
they are translated into institutional arrangements 
and practices. This is the task that lies ahead.
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